5
the literature. For example, Alexander revealed the implications for the stocking and merchandising of the store of the different patterns of decision-making control at two of the leading supermarket chains J. Sainsbury and Tesco. 10 Exploring relations further up the supply chain, Godley and Williams show how, during the 1950s and 1960s, Sainsbury's sought to manage collaborative relationships with the British poultry industry in order to control the standardisation of poultry products that was necessary as the firm transformed its retail estate from counter to self-service stores.
11
The instrumental role of branded packaged goods in the development of self-service retailing has also been identified. 12 Brands mediated shoppers' engagement with goods, 13 and brand consciousness and premium pricing cues informed shoppers' decision-making in the new self-service store environments. 14 Unsurprisingly, supermarket retailers sought to further develop their own brands not only in foods, in which they were in some cases wellestablished, but in the increasing array of non-food items that were being stocked in their larger stores. Despite such retailer innovations in marketing, manufacturers remained the dominant power in the grocery trade and even more so in the confectionery trade where the majority of products enjoyed regulatory support under R.P.M. 15 
R.P.M. in confectionery and grocery retailing
In exploring the developing relationship between supermarket retailers and manufacturers, it is important to consider the effect of government regulatory controls. These regulations had implications for the marketing activities of manufacturers and retailers. The most significant regulation that impacted the marketing strategies of manufacturers and retailers was R.P.M., which took two principal forms. Collective R.P.M. (C.R.P.M.) was regulated by the 1956
Restricted Trade Practices Act, which made it illegal for manufacturers to act in collusion to jointly enforce the retail prices at which their products could be sold. 16 Individual R.P.M.
(I.R.P.M.), between individual manufacturers and retailers, continued under the 1956
Restricted Trade Practices Act until the 1964 Resale Prices Act was introduced to prohibit individual manufacturers from enforcing prices.
The significance of I.R.P.M. for the manufacturer-retailer relationship varied, depending upon the types of goods. Government Board of Trade papers estimated that in 1960 some 12 .5% of all consumer expenditure on food commodities was affected by price maintenance, a far lower percentage than in some other commodity groups; for instance, for durable goods 75% of expenditure was affected. 17 There is some debate, therefore, about the importance of I.R.P.M. in shaping patterns of grocery retailing. Not all products were subject to I.R.P.M.
and some manufacturers did nothing to stop price cutting by retailers on price maintained goods before 1964, when they had a legal entitlement to do so. Citing this evidence,
Pickering concluded that I.R.P.M. had effectively ended on most branded groceries by 1958. 18 For confectionery goods, however, the picture was different. During the 1950s and 1960s, confectionery firms exercised the right to maintain retail prices under I.R.P.M.. 19 In other words, confectionery firms dictated the resale price of their goods to retailers. The
Board of Trade estimated that some 80% of consumer expenditure on confectionery was affected by price maintenance in 1960. 20 With the advent of the 1964 Resale Prices Act, this situation was about to change. Manufacturers seeking continued exemption were required to present their case to the Restrictive Practices Court. As we discuss below, this was a route that Cadbury and some other confectionery manufacturers embarked upon, although it was ultimately to prove unsuccessful.
The effect of I.R.P.M. abolition on the manufacturer-retailer relationship was a source of contemporary debate in post-war Britain and continues to raise questions for historians. 21 Mercer argues that as a consequence of the 1964 Resale Prices Act the system in which manufacturers had influence over retailers' margins and prices unravelled, such that 'in place 7 of retailing as a manufacturer's marketing strategy, conditions of supply were determined by the business strategies of multiple retailers'. 22 Morelli acknowledges that R.P.M. had 'restricted the ability of large retail organisations to capitalise on cost advantages by lowering prices to the consumer to increase their market'. 23 He argues, however, that the collapse of R.P.M. is insufficient to explain the subsequent concentration of supermarket retailer power from the 1990s onwards.
The work of Mercer and Morelli helps us to understand the implications of I.R.P.M. abolition for the changing balance of power between manufacturers and retailers at an aggregate level.
However, our research is more specific in seeking to understand the significance of I.R.P.M.
abolition within a sector and by giving attention to the firm, product and brand levels. In the most detailed post war treatment of Cadbury, the abolition of I.R.P.M. is cited as the 'major change' shaping 'the pattern of distribution for confectionery manufacturers', yet there has been little research that explores Cadbury's marketing practices before and after abolition. 24 As becomes clear below, in relation to the case of Cadbury, the changes introduced by I.R.P.M. abolition were not without contest and challenge.
Methodology
It has been argued that 'British marketing was highly distinctive and firmly embedded in the institutions that grew up around industries', which suggests that sector and firm level case studies are particularly useful methods of advancing knowledge in this area. 25 Cadbury acted as a powerful advocate of confectionery manufacturers in public discourse with retailers.
Concentrating attention on Cadbury provides a focal point in exploring a trade in which a wide variety of retailers and manufacturers entered into dialogue. In addition to being the largest confectionery manufacturer in the UK, Cadbury also manufactured grocery products, only record the board's decisions and provide no record of the discussions that took place. 28 Therefore, the first set of sources used in this paper, containing evidence of board room deliberations and associated correspondence, add considerably to our knowledge of the decision making that shaped Cadbury's post war marketing and distribution.
The archives reveal that senior managers and directors at Cadbury had access to bilateral correspondences between rival manufacturers and retailers, presumably as a result of historical co-operation between chocolate and confectionery manufacturers and the impetus to share knowledge in their attempt to challenge proposed changes to R.P.M.. These materials are significant as we have not as yet been able to identify retailer archives that provide detailed evidence on the issues considered by this research; in the case of Tesco, the retailer most frequently mentioned in this paper, no archive exists. Schweppes in 1969 and the creation of a multi-divisional structure. 30 Consequently a second source The Grocer, a weekly publication with a strong readership across the retailing and food production spectrum, is used to supplement the Cadbury sources and to gain further insight into the relationships between Cadbury and supermarket retailers for this period.
It is important to understand that the two sources utilised in this paper need to be interpreted in different ways. The Cadbury sources are interpreted with the understanding that managers in organisations are involved in language games through which organisational identity is constructed. 31 The voice of the manager is positioned within the firm in relation to the organisational division he or she is located within and divisional goals, but also in relation to the corporate strategy of the firm as a whole. The voice of managers in The Grocer are best understood through theories of institutional work, which emphasise the role of managers in influencing institutional contexts. 32 The Grocer provides a view of the external corporate image of Cadbury that its managers were seeking to project to retail buyers and other industry stakeholders. The content of the various sources used in this paper, therefore, must be read as constructions that are anchored in specific contexts.
Cadbury 1953-1967: Challenge to retailing as manufacturer's marketing strategy
Under I.R.P.M. manufacturers enjoyed the freedom to enforce confectionery resale prices with the consequence that retailers were primarily regarded by Cadbury as vertically integrated agents of distribution in this regard. 33 Retailers were also often dependent upon manufacturer merchandising and advertising support. However, following the effective break down of I.R.P.M. on many grocery products during the 1950s, self-service retailers and supermarkets were achieving greater strategic importance, not least in matters of pricing. The unrealised potential of supermarket retailers in confectionery sales eventually led them to seek greater concessions from Cadbury and to seek the abolition of I.R.P.M. for these goods.
In this section we provide empirical evidence that outlines Cadbury's marketing strategy and the responses of different retailers which sought to wield more influence in the supply chain.
Cadbury's Marketing Strategy
Following the end of rationing and the resumption of a competitive market for confectionery in 1953, Cadbury was characterised by a 'production-cum-marketing' orientation that had developed during the first half of the twentieth century. 34 Efficiencies achieved through economies of scale and mechanisation were used by Cadbury in a bid to outcompete rival manufacturers and create consumer loyalty to the Cadbury brand. Cadbury employed specific push and pull marketing strategies to drive sales. Cadbury's push strategies involved control over distribution, to be achieved by tight control over distributors' margins and direct supply to retailers by a team of salesmen who increasingly relied more upon the '"saleability" of a line than the salesman's persuasion'. 35 of the main manufacturers to benefit from the rise of self-service grocers, by virtue of the fact that it had nurtured CTNs as its main distribution outlet. 40 The pull side of the marketing equation was achieved through mass advertising on a limited range of products, and a strong corporate house brand. Cadbury began working with advertising agencies to produce television commercials; being one of the first brands to appear in 1955. A revised marketing approach emerged that focused on promoting new products that were launched with in store displays, posters, money off coupons, press and television advertising; the first example of this new strategy being the launch of a grocery item, 'Half Covered Biscuits', in 1957. 41 During the early 1960s, 20 individually branded products out of 60 were the focus of major advertising campaigns by Cadbury, compared to only four heavily advertised products in the inter-war period. 42 Cadbury responded to competitors by increasing its total spending on advertising chocolate from £1,581,000 in 1960, to £2,018,000 in 1961; part of an effort to compete with the launch of Galaxy by rival
Mars in the autumn of 1960. 43 National chocolate consumption remained static, however, whilst advertising revenues continued to increase to a trade total of £11.1 million in 1962, of which Cadbury accounted for £3,521,000. 44 Cadbury defended I.R.P.M. on its confectionery lines during this period, but the situation it faced in the grocery goods trade was more complicated, including greater pressure for price cutting from some retailers. Cadbury archival sources reveal that following the 1956 abolition 12 of C.R.P.M. on grocery products, the firm was monitoring the effect of price cutting on grocery sales and the disposition of independent retailers towards this. For example, Cadbury kept detailed records of sales of rival Nestlé's coffee brand, Nescafé, which increased as a result of retailer price cutting. Cadbury noted that Nestlé had frustrated independent grocers due to their margins policy, which meant that large multiples retailers were able to sell to consumers below the price that independents could buy Nescafé through wholesalers. 45 An internal Cadbury memorandum from the Marketing Group of the Bournville Sales Committee stated that: 'Our own approach to the question of price maintenance has never been doctrinaire, and our policy would continue to be determined empirically as in the past.'
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Manufacturing both confectionery and grocery lines, Cadbury was aware that I.R.P.M. could protect distribution through independent grocers and CTNs, but equally it could hinder sales through multiple retailers that were rapidly adopting self-service and supermarket formats.
Cadbury relations with supermarket retailers
The paper now turns to examine the tactics adopted by supermarket retailers in the lead up to confectionery I.R.P.M. abolition. It reveals the growing power of supermarket operators that were seeking to have their marketing strategies recognised and supported by manufacturers.
To this end a variety of tactics were employed by the retailers, which were met with a robust response from Cadbury. For example, an internal Cadbury memorandum on the grocery trade from 1964 described a market inhabited by 'deal conscious and concession spoilt operators'. 47 The same memorandum provided examples of the promotional allowances requested by retailers, including those operating supermarkets, such as Elmo, Anthony Victor Value. Cadbury reported sales two to three times higher in the first quarter and three to six times higher in the fourth quarter. 64 
Cadbury and the abolition of I.R.P.M. in confectionery
The key event that closes our first time period was the Restrictive Practices Court hearing relating to confectionery goods on 25 July 1967. 65 In reviewing the archive materials related to the I.R.P.M. case prepared by Cadbury, we learn much about the importance of different types of retailers as constituents of Cadbury's marketing strategy. I.R.P.M. enabled Cadbury to fix the retail price of its confectionery products and to protect CTNs from competition from self-service grocers. Protecting high-service dealers was considered to be important by Cadbury, because the firm considered confectionery to be an impulse purchase that required widespread distribution. The archives reveal that some economists who were proponents of I.R.P.M. lent their support to Cadbury.
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As the largest confectionery manufacturer in the UK, Cadbury was placed in a difficult position when it chose to defend I.R.P.M. in the Restrictive Practices Court. Cadbury's corporate reputation was based around the public narrative of fair play enshrined in 'Cadburyism', 67 a corporate identity rooted in the Quakerism of the firm's founders. In the I.R.P.M. case 'Cadburyism' was tested across three main stakeholder groups i.e. retailers, the consuming public and other manufacturers.
First, and foremost with regard to the focus of this paper, Cadbury had to account for the views of its retail stakeholders, which varied from the small CTNs, many turning less than £200 of Cadbury products annually, to grocery and confectionery retailers operating large chains of stores and doing trade measured in some cases in excess of £100,000. In two cases, Woolworths and the CWS, accounts exceeded one million pounds.
17
shone a powerful light on the conundrum faced by manufacturers like Cadbury whose products were distributed by large-scale and small-scale retailers alike. At the other end of the retail spectrum were a myriad of small CTNs. In its submission to the Restrictive Practices Court, Cadbury predicted that without I.R.P.M. self-service stores and supermarkets would disrupt current patterns of distribution and change consumer behaviour to the detriment of the specialist retail trade. Based on its calculations of changes to confectionery and tobacco trading (also affected by I.R.P.M.) post I.R.P.M. Cadbury predicted a 50% reduction in large sweet shops, a 40% reduction in medium-sized sweet shops and a 30% reduction in small sweet shops. 73 The Court's opinion was that a 1% rise in confectionery margins would prevent a reduction in the number of retail outlets, but Cadbury argued that this would be insufficient.
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Newspapers positioned Cadbury as championing the cause of CTNs. 74 However, Cadbury's position towards the small independent confectionery retailer was more ambiguous than was reported in public. Cadbury was aware of the low value of the smallest CTNs to its bottom line. 75 'as far as the public is concerned it is quite clear that the policy which is most acceptable is one that supports the abolition of r.p.m., because it brings lower prices, whilst expressing concern at the effect on small shopkeepers'.
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Third, Cadbury also had to gain support from rival manufacturers in order to fight the I.R.P.M. case, but not all manufacturers were convinced that I.R.P.M. was in their best interests. Fitzgerald notes that under I.R.P.M., 'competition to an important extent was dependent upon marketing, product development, advertising and branding rather than price'
and it is clear that large scale confectionery manufacturers had already achieved an oligopoly status that would enable them to sustain high profit margins in a post-I.R.P.M. environment. 82 The case of Mars is illustrative of the challenges that Cadbury faced in this regard. Mars is reported to have written to its retail customers in March 1965 to the effect that it was going to maintain the price of its goods and that it would withhold supplies from price cutters. 83 When
Mars subsequently communicated their intention to stay out of the I.R.P.M. court case, Cadbury Marketing Director, R.N. Wadsworth, wrote to Mars to express a concern that the court might infer from its non-appearance as a witness that Mars wished to see the end of I.R.P.M. 84 Cadbury was subsequently unable to persuade Mars to defend I.R.P.M., which suggests that Mars may have perceived the advantages of a more liberalised market for its business model focussed upon a small number of heavily advertised countlines.
Lacking support from major confectionery manufacturers Mars and Nestlé, and its largest retail account, Woolworths, Cadbury nevertheless decided to fight the I.R.P.M. case. 85 Paradoxically, the firm could see certain disadvantages in I.R.P.M. and some senior managers 20 were equivocal as to the merits of its continuation. R.N. Wadsworth, described the situation thus:
It is quite possible that although the total industry output may be reduced, the Five leading firms could benefit from the ending of R.P.M. with a larger share of a smaller market. If we believe this, then we find ourselves fighting a case which is not in our own interest. 86 Cadbury subsequently lost the case and faced a new market environment in which supermarket retailers were to become more significant.
Cadbury 1968-1975: Collaboration in retailer-manufacturer marketing strategy
The business history literature emphasises an increasing drive for profitability as a key focus of Cadbury planning in this period. 87 Attempts to increase profitability since 1957 had resulted in limited success in Cadbury's UK operations, with static demand for confectionery a notable barrier. In this context, Cadbury's merger with Schweppes in 1969 is highlighted as an event that signalled a shift from a more patient long-term orientation towards profitability towards a more short term one. 88 More widely, the Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes notes the significance of changes in retailing as a driver of such activity in this period:
The increasing concentration in the retail trade with the development of supermarkets and the abolition of resale price maintenance had a considerable influence on concentration among manufacturers. The balance of power was changing in favour of the large retailer, which led to further concentration both in distribution and among manufacturers in their attempt to restore the equilibrium as they saw it. 89 
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The merger accelerated the strategy of diversification that had begun in 1962 with the initial move into packaged cakes. In the following sections, the paper explores attempts by supermarket retailers to fundamentally influence Cadbury's marketing strategy in two key areas of marketing practice. It examines Cadbury's innovative responses as it sought to reconcile its position in an I.R.P.M. free market situation in confectionery as well as grocery goods.
Advertising and promotions
In 1966, Cadbury had predicted that post-I.R.P.M. they would need to 'force the hands' of distributors by increasing advertising spend in order to stimulate consumer demand for confectionery. The firm also foresaw the need to make special payments for display with large grocery distributors in return for point of sale support. 93 For example, Marketing promotions the manufacturer will have to negotiate with the trader and to offer special terms which will enable the trader to cut the price of the product and thereby secure sufficiently increased sales to increase his profits. 94 In 1967, some 3.5% of all chocolate and sugar confectionery sales were through 2,625 supermarkets, with a further 5.5% of sales accounted for by other types of self-service grocery store. 95 Cadbury estimated that there were over 10,000 count lines in the UK confectionery market and that following I.R.P.M. abolition the major growth in distribution would come through supermarket outlets, which on average stocked no more than 100 lines. assortments. 98 The potential of the retail grocery trade was clear, with more than double the number of outlets but accounting for only half the turnover of confectioners. 99 The increased potential for supermarket retailers to join confectionery multiples in demanding enhanced promotional terms aggravated existing grievances of some independent 23 retailers in the trade. For example, in mid-July 1967, with I.R.P.M. about to be abolished, 1s
bars of chocolate with a 2d money-off promotion were reported to have been distributed to the supermarkets and confectionery multiples, but not to independent retailers, much to the latter's dismay. Cadbury explained it as a 'coincidence', but independent retailers and their representatives complained that they were again being disadvantaged.
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The development of advertising and promotional strategies in a period of considerably Grocery 55/45. 103 Given that Cadbury had identified that the majority of its future confectionery products would be sold through grocery multiples, 104 the data suggested that above the line expenditure on confectionery might be at risk.
Wadsworth defended above the line expenditure, invoking the experience of building consumer support for the Marvel brand. 105 He reasoned that below the line promotions would not help consumers to change their preferences about a product. Accepting that historical 24 terms of trade (i.e. margins) were irreversible and should be regarded as a concession, Wadsworth argued that further expansion of below the line expenditure should only be on the basis of pay by performance. Wadsworth concluded by stating that greater levels of cooperation were envisaged in the future, because the relationship between the manufacturer and retailer was no longer between a buyer and seller, but 'between a manufacturer and the owner of an advertising medium'.
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The enhanced power of the supermarket retailers drew manufacturers into collaboration on promotions. In April 1968, Cadbury announced that it was no longer going to recommend retail prices for grocery products, thereby giving retailers more control over pricing and more freedom to discount goods. 107 One month later the firm launched a new marketing strategy with Tesco, offering Green Shield Stamps on packs of Mini-Rolls in a two week promotion.
Cadbury defended its decision in The Grocer magazine thus:
Allowances are being made and these are in line with modern marketing methods where certain sums are made available for promotions with major customers with high turnover -the method of spending these sums being determined by the customer.
108
This use of stamps was reported to be the first of its kind by a British manufacturer and invoked criticisms from non-stamp competitor Sainsbury's, whose position gained support from adopters of rival stamp schemes, Allied and Fine Fare. 109 Non-stamp retailers, in particular, saw the Cadbury deal as offering a below the line reduction to Tesco that could not be replicated. They also protested that Cadbury might start printing stamp offers on all its packs, which would discriminate against non-stamp trading competitors on a more permanent basis. 110 
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Distribution and merchandising
Renewed negotiations over advertising and promotional strategies were accompanied by changes in retailers' distribution practices. These latter practices caused Cadbury to seek innovative forms of merchandising partnership with retailers in order to retain influence at the point of sale.
In the 1960s, the sales representatives at Cadbury had multiple roles. They were responsible for taking orders, promoting product lines, product display, pricing, merchandising and stocking shelves. 111 In 1966, Cadbury delivered confectionery goods directly to branch stores or wholesalers with the exception of Sainsbury's and Maynards, which it supplied through retailer depots. 112 The pattern of distribution between manufacturers and the large-scale grocery multiples began to change over the ensuing decade, as the multiples explored options to further centralise the buying and distribution functions rather than continue to rely on direct to store deliveries. It costs £3,000 a year to keep a merchandiser on the road. Multiply £3,000 by the number of merchandisers a manufacturer has and the result is a terrific oncost. We, the manufacturer's customers have to pay this money -it's added to their selling cost. But the service we get from manufacturer's merchandisers isn't a patch on our own staff.
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The view was not restricted to the management of supermarket retailers only. For example David Frewin, manager of an independent store, argued that manufacturers'
representatives were not communicating effectively with each other and with their own central management. The implication was that manufacturers would be better served by outsourcing many of the sales representatives' functions to the retailer.
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Store managers also expressed dissatisfaction with the situation. For example, one
Tesco store manager commented that he had enquiries from 200 merchandisers every week at his store, which made it impossible to coordinate in-store marketing given the impossibility of remembering the different promotions and schemes being run by rival manufacturers. 118 He also argued that manufacturers' display material:
…clashes with the product sheets, guards, advertising material which our company has issued us for particular promotions…The average card left behind or stuck on the shelf by a salesman is so diabolical, that as soon as he has turned his back I take the thing off. 119 
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Cadbury sought to pre-empt the concerns of retailers, arguing that supermarket retailers would need to be educated about modern merchandising methods, devoting 16 merchandisers to work exclusively with supermarket outlets.
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As the role of sales representatives was scrutinised by retailers, manufacturers like
Cadbury were faced with the threat of diminishing opportunities to directly control the display of their products in store. Manufacturers now turned to other more indirect means in an attempt to influence the merchandising of important categories.
Outlining their strategy for confectionery post I.R.P.M., Cadbury stated that:
Multiple and self-service store operators will be asked to establish permanent confectionery sections, or permit existing sections to be redesigned, following prepared merchandising principles. Sales for a given period will be carefully measured and related to sales over the same length of time before the section was redesigned.
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Cadbury trialled this new approach with Bishops Stores Ltd., the London based self-service and supermarket retailer.
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The case of Smash instant mashed potato (hereafter IMP) provides an important example from the grocery trade of attempts to use more indirect means to influence merchandising. 
Conclusion
This paper argues that the rise of self-service and supermarket retailers had an impact on Cadbury's marketing strategy, requiring the manufacturer to evaluate the changing role of retailers in the distribution of its goods, and to innovate in response to the changes occurring.
The analysis of previously neglected company archival data provides evidence of Cadbury's early experimentation in confectionery merchandising in supermarkets. Moreover, we focus attention on Cadbury's responses to the increasing promotional demands that some retailers operating chains of supermarkets sought to exert upon the manufacturer in the period leading up to the abolition of confectionery I.R.P.M. in 1967. The significance and the influence of the supermarket retailers grew as the debates over the case for abolition intensified.
Thereafter, Cadbury sought to establish strategic marketing partnerships with key retailers that would allow it to retain some control over retailers' distribution and merchandising of its confectionery goods, albeit increasingly by more indirect means. This approach was mirrored in relation to grocery goods, a trade into which Cadbury progressively diversified as growth opportunities in the confectionery market lessened. In sum, as supermarket retailers strengthened their position within Cadbury's supply chains asserting themselves as strategic 29 partners in decision-making across many aspects of distribution, so Cadbury was forced to respond in order to bolster its position.
Whilst the abolition of I.R.P.M. clearly marked a watershed moment in Cadbury's relationship with the retailers that distributed its confectionery products, it is too simplistic to claim that abolition of I.R.P.M. was the only influential factor when seeking to understand the changing relationship between confectionery manufacturers and retailers and the resulting impact on marketing practices in the period. Nevertheless, the abolition of I.R.P.M. did enhance the strategic power and position of large-scale grocery retailers, which were increasingly operating supermarket outlets, towards manufacturers like Cadbury. The consequence of this was that Cadbury had to further revise its marketing strategy and develop innovative practices in order to exert influence at the retail end of the supply chain. As such, Cadbury, like other manufacturers, was seeking to respond to and, where it felt it appropriate, to contest challenges posed by the increasing power exercised by some retailers.
Building upon the evidence of Cadbury's earlier historical development, the paper contributes new knowledge of Cadbury's movement along the spectrum from a more heavily production oriented approach to more of a marketing orientation; from a position in which it could dictate terms to retailers through the control of margins, inventory and distribution, to one in which it was necessary to pioneer new forms of promotion and merchandising in an attempt to maintain its historical advantage. The paper, therefore, contributes to the business history literature on the evolution of manufacturer-retailer relationships and attempts to account for the role of market regulation in shaping the characteristics of firm's strategies.
The paper also contributes to recent calls to enhance the attention given to the wider food system and its production-consumption chains when interpreting the rise of the supermarket. 127 In particular, by comparing and contrasting the marketing activities of 30 Cadbury under the differing conditions of the post war confectionery and grocery goods markets, we reveal the complexity of one firm's interactions with an increasingly powerful retail sector. Like in other areas of the food industry, as shown, for example, by Godley and William's study of the poultry sector, the activities of retailers operating growing chains of self-service stores and supermarkets were influential. 128 However, the findings of this paper
show that the consequences for manufacturers' marketing strategies of rising retailer power played out in markedly differing ways across the food market.
More specifically, in exploring the link between marketing and structural change the paper confirms the importance of adopting a contextualised approach when researching the confectionery trade in different national contexts. 129 Researching the UK confectionery industry emphasises the importance of contextualising marketing innovations within a network of relations including companies (other manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers), government, and consumers.
A number of areas for further study can be identified. First, in the space of this paper it has not been possible to examine in any detail the evidence for any exchange of knowledge and practices between Cadbury divisions with regard to marketing. Previous research into the confectionery trade has demonstrated the importance of managerial structures and cultural imprinting to corporate decision making, which suggests this could be a fertile area for further research. 130 Second, the literature identifying communities of practice as vectors of retail innovation suggest that manufacturers' trade associations may have been significant in shaping manufacturers' marketing innovations: 131 for example, The Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Alliance. Third, whilst it is well established that retail innovations like the supermarket can occur through the geographical transfer of knowledge across national contexts, it does not mean that the findings of this research can be generalised to other international contexts in a simple manner. As this research has taken pains to demonstrate, 31 the UK has a specific constellation of regulations and sectoral collaborations that have conditioned the development of marketing strategies by manufacturers with retailers. The paper, therefore, provides further evidence of the need to understand the processes by which retailers operating supermarket formats become embedded in the markets in which they trade. 
